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This lecture discusses the features of the colonial situation in Latin 
America that conditioned the region’s economic and social performance 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It deals in particular with 
Argentina, looking at the events following the First World War through to 
the beginning of the Second World War. Those events were formative in the 
education and experience of Raúl Prebisch, who 30 years later would give 
ECLAC its fundamental characteristics. The lecture examines the ideas that 
ECLAC contributed to the debate on Latin American development and the 
evolution of the countries that applied those ideas. It also looks at the external 
and internal circumstances that changed the context in which development 
policies were implemented from the middle of the 1970s onwards. Lastly, it 
identifi es the most recent changes in the world economic situation, and the 
role of ECLAC in defending the ideas of freedom, well-being and tolerance, 
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  This lecture was delivered at the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile on 16 August 2007) on 
the occasion of the Seventh Raúl Prebisch Lecture.
When I learned that I was to be asked to give 
the Seventh Prebisch Lecture, my fi rst thought was 
how to avoid disappointing those who had extended 
me this rather daunting honour. It occurred to me 
that, in selecting an historian for the occasion, the 
Commission was hoping for something different from 
the offerings of those who had previously taken this 
podium. I would not be able to look for inspiration, 
then, to the contributions of those eminent persons, 
from Celso Furtado to Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
who had played a sometimes decisive role in the chapter 
of Latin America’s history that includes the trajectory 
of ECLAC, nor to those of Joseph Stiglitz and Dani 
Rodrik, both renowned economists able to speak with 
absolute authority on issues where prudence forbids 
me to tread. Instead, I heeded the advice of José Luis 
Machinea, who in his letter of invitation expressed 
the hope that my presentation would contribute to 
“understanding the long-term trends and the evolution 
of the social phenomena that underlie the functioning 
of countries in the region”, and that is what I shall 
attempt to do here.
The first thing that becomes clear, from this 
perspective, is that ECLAC was established to articulate 
a response, suitable for the stage in which Latin 
America found itself at the time, to a question that was 
already two centuries old. The quest had originally been 
to fi nd the key to overcoming what was already referred 
to as the lag of the far-off lands of the new world that 
Castile and Portugal had conquered and subsumed into 
their overseas empires. It would seek inspiration for this 
in a new science, one that abandoned the overarching 
perspectives that had placed metaphysics at both the 
base and the pinnacle of knowledge, and turned its 
attention to what the already outdated Aristotelian 
language called the “sublunar world”, in the hope that 
a more accurate understanding of this mundane sphere 
would help to make the changes that would alleviate 
the harshness of human existence. Within this radical 
new approach, there arose in the eighteenth century 
the discipline called “political economy”, which from 
its fi rst systematic formulation in the works of Adam 
Smith came to occupy an ever more central place in 
the encyclopaedia of modern knowledge.
Yet even before 1776, when Adam Smith 
published his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations, those responsible for 
administering the overseas empires of Spain and 
Portugal were already addressing the economic 
problems there in the spirit of the new times. They 
saw, with growing clarity, that the practices that had 
seen them virtually unscathed through more than two 
centuries with ever more formidable rivals constantly 
entering the scene, fi rst in Europe and then overseas, 
were fast losing their effectiveness.
Indeed, it was awareness of the increasing fragility 
of the Iberian empires that drove their administrators 
to consider the new perspectives offered by political 
economy. They hoped this would help them to develop 
strategies to replace those that had been found 
increasingly wanting. When we look back at the 
relationship that the administrators of both imperial 
systems established with this discipline, then still in its 
infancy, we can see a foreshadowing of how ECLAC 
would work with it in the twentieth century. It is also 
easy to recognize, behind those shared traits, the 
infl uence of the periphery from which both they and 
it viewed the economic system, whose operating rules 
this new discipline sought to unentangle.
Viewed from the centre of this emerging system, 
Adam Smith’s theoretical construction could also 
be seen as the “country party’s” indictment of the 
mercantilist privileges and monopolies fl owing from 
royal favour, as defended by the “court party”. The 
centre in fact had built a society that was discovering 
itself capable of charting the road to prosperity on its 
own. But the profi le of the societies emerging from the 
Iberian conquest of the new world could not have been 
more different. Offi cials in Madrid or Lisbon trying to 
administer their far-fl ung empires on three continents 
were fi nding it increasingly diffi cult to wring from 
them the resources needed to withstand the attacks 
of these ever bolder rivals. They looked to political 
economy for useful lessons in how to build societies in 
those lands that could emulate the vigour refl ected in 
the overwhelming economic and technical —and thus 
military— superiority of these same rivals.
This ambitious project was realized too 
incompletely to protect the Iberian empires from an 
external threat which, having mounted greatly during 
the new cycle of hostilities launched by the French 
Revolution, would lead to their irreversible demise. 
But the programme of reforms left as its legacy an 
agenda that the States emerging from the ruins of 
both empires would adopt as their own. It was now 
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their ambition to organize themselves on the model of 
the “Nation State”, whose advance in the old world, 
despite the efforts of Napoleon’s vanquishers to halt 
it in 1815, would dominate the entire coming century 
of European history. It would become clear over this 
century how important it was to endow the fragmented 
societies bequeathed by the conquest and the colonial 
period with the coherence needed to lay the human 
foundations for the nationality that each of these 
States aspired to construct as its political expression. 
Although the objective was now different, it was still 
recognized that the most urgent task of these newborn 
States was to bring about a radical transformation of the 
societal profi le that had matured in the previous stage, 
and to bring it closer to that of the nations leading a 
process of change which, starting from the Atlantic 
seaboard of Europe, seemed destined to embrace the 
entire planet.
The successor States in all of the splintered 
domains of the Iberian empires assumed this task, 
but nowhere was this ambition carried so far as in 
Argentina. The preamble to the document that in 1853 
marked that country’s entry into the constitutional 
era called upon “all the men of the world who want 
to live on Argentine soil” to join in building, on the 
vast and empty pampa, a radically new society, based 
on both material and human resources imported from 
overseas. No doubt leaders of this dizzying process 
of change placed great faith in the principles of the 
by now mature discipline of political economy, which 
severely constrained the role of the State in this area. 
But that did not prevent the State they organized and 
administered from fi nding ways to exert sway over the 
economic dimension of the vast transformation they 
had undertaken. Their success was such that by the 
dawn of the new century —and even before the peak 
of a fl ood of immigrants that would see few parallels 
around the world— it was already possible to discern 
the outline of the modern nation that, half a century 
before, Argentina had resolved to become.
We need to pause a moment at this point in what 
is necessarily a cursory exploration of the historical 
background of ECLAC, because this context, so 
distinct from the circumstances that would surround the 
creation of this United Nations agency, was to make 
an indelible mark on the person who fi rst defi ned its 
agenda. Such a mark that, barely beyond adolescence, 
Raúl Prebisch had already defined with amazing 
precision the place he was determined to conquer in the 
world, and in that young man, we can already recognize 
the person who, a quarter-century later, having been 
stripped of the place he had come to occupy in his 
native land, was to defi ne no less precisely the agenda 
of the institution he would lead.
The context in which Prebisch began his public 
career was marked not only by the successful culmination 
of the enormous experiment in social engineering that 
his country had embarked upon in the middle of the 
previous century. It also refl ected the mindset with 
which those same problems were being addressed 
both in the old world and in the new. At this fl eeting 
moment, with the slaughter of the First World War 
still a fresh memory, both these worlds lived in the 
mistaken assurance that they were entering a stage of 
profound social and political transformation that would 
bring greater justice to relations between people and 
nations. A corollary of that vision of the times was the 
conviction that youth —better prepared for this task 
than the generations raised in the vanished pre-war 
world— was destined to seize the leading role it had 
never had before.
On the basis of these widely shared convictions, 
Prebisch was to lay out a programme of life and action 
that could not be more ambitious. A member of one 
of the fi rst classes trained in the Faculty of Economic 
Sciences created by the University of Buenos Aires 
in 1913, and an instigator of the agitation thanks to 
which the student body won a place in the governance 
of Argentina’s universities, Prebisch was hardly more 
than a teenager. Yet he was the recognized leader of 
his university cohort, and he urged them to devote 
themselves to a profound overhaul of Argentina’s 
socio-economic order, one in which the cornerstones 
would be agrarian and f iscal reform, the latter 
designed to eliminate the regressive features of the 
existing tax system.
These objectives were by no means new—the 
political leadership and, more unexpectedly, the 
corporate representatives of the landholding interests 
grouped in the Sociedad Rural Argentina (“Argentine 
Rural Society”) had been decrying the evils of 
concentrated land ownership embodied in the latifundio 
for decades. But what was new was the strategy that 
Prebisch proposed to his fellow students for moving the 
programme forward. He urged them, in effect, to “fi nd 
in State agencies and other institutions” observatories 
from which to gain an accurate understanding of the 
workings of the economic system they hoped to change. 
Half a century later Eduardo Malaccorto, who was be 
one of Prebisch’s most effective collaborators in the 
Argentine phase of his career, would recall that, in 
response to the challenge of a young man who was 
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“already a revolutionary at the age of 22 […] every 
one of us wanted to get into some sector of national 
life, where we could develop our own ideas and perfect 
our knowledge”.1
No one would do this more successfully than 
Prebisch himself. His early contributions to introducing 
statistical methods in economic analysis had already 
attracted the attention of Professor Alejandro Bunge, 
who in 1916, with his Riqueza y renta de la Argentina 
(“Wealth and income in Argentina”), had brought new 
rigour to a fi eld hitherto dominated by amateurs. In 
1922, the Argentine Rural Society had already made 
Prebisch the head of its newly created Statistical Offi ce. 
The following year the Minister of Finance, Raphael 
Herrera Vegas, who hoped to introduce income tax in 
Argentina and was facing strong counter-arguments 
that it would be impossible to enforce such a tax in 
a country with an agricultural economy, asked him to 
go to Australia and New Zealand and to fi nd out how 
those two countries, which shared this economic profi le 
with Argentina, had succeeded in implementing such 
a tax. Yet on the eve of Prebisch’s departure, Herrera 
Vegas was replaced in the ministry and his successor 
cut the mission short. This did not prevent Prebisch 
from completing the assigned task, however. What 
is more, was also able to familiarize himself with 
the government statistical agencies of those British 
dominions, which were pioneers in the use of the 
“statistical machines” that were revolutionizing working 
methods in this field. As well —motivated by his 
interest in Argentina’s land problem— he explored in 
situ the outcomes of the rural colonization plan in the 
Australian province of New South Wales. Meanwhile 
Tomás Le Breton, whom Prebisch knew from his time 
with the Argentine Rural Society, and who had recently 
been appointed Minister of Agriculture, was planning 
to introduce a very ambitious agrarian reform. He 
summoned Prebisch, upon his return, to work with 
him in preparing the draft of that plan, which, however, 
would never be addressed by Congress.
In the following years, Prebisch played a leading 
role in government statistical work, fi rst as Deputy 
Director of the National Department of Statistics 
and later as organizer and fi rst Director of the new 
Economic Research Division created by Banco de la 
Nación Argentina, based on the model in use at the 
United States Federal Reserve. He also became senior 
1 1971 interview with Ernesto Malaccorto (Halperin Donghi, 2004, 
pp. 469 to 471).
adviser to the Argentine Rural Society, the largest 
organization representing the landholding class, from 
which position he contributed more than anyone to 
articulating proposals for dealing with the increasingly 
critical situation facing the rural economy.
This summary suggests an early career that, at 
first glance, could not have been more successful. 
Yet, perhaps not so, in the light of the objectives that 
Prebisch had set himself. What was, at that time, his 
vision of the world he hoped to change? What did that 
vision tell him about the place from which he could 
infl uence that change? He was not yet 20 years old 
when, responding to a survey on the social question 
conducted by the Revista de Ciencias Económicas, 
he argued that the key to the matter lay in the misfi t 
between the economic structure that was being steadily 
transformed by “the advance of productive methods 
due to technical progress” and “a parallel change in 
the social superstructure that governed the old relations 
between those who produced and those who managed 
production” that was lagging far behind. Although he 
recognized his debt to Marx with respect to this point, 
he had made it clear that he was not prepared to follow 
Marx in making the class struggle the exclusive and 
central theme of human history, and he found “more 
logical” the arguments of the socialist Filippo Turati, 
who “in certain cases” saw “class cooperation as a 
counterweight to class struggle”.
The existence of this alternative, he concluded, 
allowed a non-revolutionary solution to the social 
question, by “creating new forms, reforming existing 
institutions, and taking advantage of what works”. From 
this premise, Prebisch reached a conclusion that was by 
no means implicit, but one that appeared so obvious to 
him that he mentioned it merely as an aside: “Social 
evolution,” he added, “cannot be contained: it is useless 
to try to stop it; it is logical to try to channel it (and 
this is the task of governments)”.2 It is not surprising 
that this conclusion appeared so obvious to him, in a 
country that was just emerging from a stage in which 
the State had assumed the dual task of organizing itself 
and forging a new society; it thus seemed reasonable 
that the demiurge of that society should not be denied 
the —altogether more modest— role of arbitrating any 
confl icts that would divide its creation.
In this implicit vision of the context that Prebisch 
hoped to infl uence, he was (perhaps without realizing 
2 Raúl Prebisch Foundation (1991, vol. I, pp. 11 and 12).
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it) relying on being able to do so successfully from the 
increasingly infl uential positions which his talents and 
his efforts secured throughout the 1920s. Yet as that 
decade closed, the results could not have been more 
discouraging: none of the reform projects he had helped 
prepare, not even the one to which he had rallied the 
most powerful segment of the landowning class, had 
taken so much as a fi rst step towards implementation. 
He had forged his links with that sector in his fi rst 
venture into public life which, like so much in his 
career, was nothing if not precocious: it occurred in 
1922, when he arbitrated the dispute that was dividing 
the powerful livestock industry. The stance he took in 
that early role was that of someone setting an agenda 
for the sector that it would surely adopt if only it had 
the foresight to do so. On this point, Prebisch made no 
attempt to conceal his opinion of the landowning class, 
which he described as a “barn aristocracy”. It had, he 
insisted, only an “incoherent, disoriented and negative 
class instinct, most of the time” and therefore lacked 
a “clear awareness of its economic interests”, which 
would have led its members to “associate to organize 
the sales from their haciendas” as their rivals in the 
United States and the British dominions were then 
successfully doing.
These shortcomings obliged the State to intervene 
in confl icts between sectors of the landowning class and 
the meatpacking interests that dominated the export 
trade. Yet Prebisch did not think the State should do 
so by using public money to create an alternative 
marketing mechanism to the regime of the meatpackers 
and shipping companies, as the self-proclaimed victims 
were proposing. What was needed was to compensate 
for the failings of a class that did not know how to 
defend its own interests, by establishing a permanent 
audit of the meatpackers’ books. This would yield 
the information needed to impose a well-founded 
“minimum elastic price” on meat for export, which 
would be adjusted as necessary to fluctuations in 
overseas demand. Such a mechanism would eliminate 
both abusive profits for the meatpackers and the 
possibility of windfalls for producers stemming from 
an excessive minimum price (which would also hurt 
export demand). Prebisch was already aware that for the 
State to play this role successfully it would need “high 
moral standards among the public offi cials entrusted to 
administer and oversee the industry […] and a technical 
capacity somewhat foreign to our bureaucracy, which 
has been formed with a penchant for satisfying the 
appetites of Creole politics rather than selecting the 
most capable people”.3
An essential fi rst step towards achieving the goals 
that Prebisch had set for himself and his generation 
was the creation of a capable technical bureaucracy 
to provide the State apparatus with the skills to 
intervene effectively in the economy. But was it solely 
as a result of the shortcomings of certain groups with 
confl icting economic and social interests that the State 
had to intervene? The range of projects with which 
Prebisch was associated attributed to the State the more 
ambitious purpose of serving objectives that would 
be shared by society as a whole. This consideration 
was already evident in his proposal for resolving the 
livestock conflict. There, he not only attempted to 
overcome the obstacles that prevented the return on the 
different factors of production from being proportional 
to their contribution to the productive process, but he 
also sought to ensure that the sector could develop to 
the fullest extend possible in the economic context of 
the time. This approach was decidedly central to the 
draft law on agrarian colonization: this proposed a 
radical transformation in the socio-economic structure 
of the grain-growing basins of the pampas, where the 
social pattern implanted in the past half-century of 
feverish expansion of the farming frontier had been 
criticized for decades.
In setting the socio-economic objectives of the 
projects they were promoting, Prebisch and the group 
that formed around him were not trying to be particularly 
original. On the contrary, what they wanted was to give 
the State and the confl icting interest groups in the 
economic and social arena the necessary competence 
to realize aspirations on which there was very broad 
consensus in Argentina. Nor did they seek to introduce 
original perspectives in the fi eld of economic theory. 
Once again, the testimony of Malaccorto encompasses 
all the members of this group, when he declares that 
in his time at the Faculty of Economic Sciences its 
members had embraced “economic theories that could 
be found in any textbook: Marshall, Pantaleoni, Barone 
or the disciples of Pareto”. The portrayal of this array 
of economists with such widely differing theories as 
the exponents of a body of knowledge so unifi ed in 
theory and practice that one could turn to any of them 
with indifference could be expected from persons who 
needed to believe that any of these economists could 
3 Raúl Prebisch Foundation (1991, vol. I, p. 349).
12 C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 4  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 8
ECLAC IN ITS HISTORICAL SETTING  •  TULIO HALPERIN
provide them with totally reliable criteria for intervening 
successfully in socio-economics—something they could 
not have obtained, of course, from a discipline that 
had failed to overcome the lengthy coexistence of 
rival doctrines. So, given the role they had attributed 
to economic theory as the source of legitimacy for 
their eminently practical plans, it was all the more 
unthinkable that they would deviate from the principles 
that theory had taught them in their formative years. 
Indeed, they would adhere closely to those principles 
in the following decade, despite growing evidence of 
their inability to offer answers to the increasingly acute 
dilemmas posed by a world economy that seemed to 
have entered a freefall.
It was precisely the depth of the world crisis 
unleashed in 1929, and dramatically worsened in 1931, 
that radically changed the Prebisch group’s standing 
in the country. The general collapse of prices and the 
sharp contraction of international trade badly hurt an 
economy that had enjoyed robust growth for more than 
a century, fuelled by fl ourishing exports. In the face 
of this emergency, with exports drastically reduced 
in volume and even more drastically in value, their 
much-diminished proceeds had to be distributed among 
the different sectors of the economy and society, and 
the volume of output for export controlled in order 
to avoid oversupply, which would drive prices down 
even further. The only agent capable of handling these 
tasks was the State. In effect, circumstances were now 
thrusting upon the State the role of arbitrator between 
groups with confl icting economic and social interests, 
a role which Prebisch and his followers had from the 
beginning insisted it should adopt.
In this unexpected context, often the very people 
who, up to the eve of the crisis, had consistently and 
fi ercely resisted any attempt to use State power to limit 
their freedom of action were now urging it to intervene 
in the fi eld they would have previously forbidden. This 
totally exceptional situation gave Prebisch the chance 
to introduce a profound fi scal and banking reform, with 
the technical cooperation of the group that he himself, 
more than anyone, had helped to form. Moreover, he 
was able to use the institutions created by that reform to 
effect trade-offs between economic and social interests, 
something he had always believed to be an essential 
duty of government. For nearly nine years following 
1935, Prebisch himself, as head of the Central Bank, 
would be responsible for checking and regulating the 
daily pulse of the Argentine economy, with results that 
won him the backing of Keynes in his General Theory 
of 1936 and led others to compare his performance 
with that of Hjalmar Schacht in Germany. Yet this was 
not a comparison that Prebisch would fi nd particularly 
fl attering: more than the successes he reaped at this 
time (in which he was aware that good fortune had 
played a considerable part), he prized his role in 
the effort to forge a techno-bureaucracy that would 
equip the Argentine government to act authoritatively 
and effectively in fi elds that until recently had been 
completely foreign to it.
But it was not merely the catastrophic turn 
taken by the world economy that gave Prebisch the 
chance to advance the ambitious programme he had 
set in 1922 for himself and the contemporary group 
of young economists whose acknowledged leader he 
was. His infl uence was given a decisive boost by the 
new political framework that emerged from the fi rst 
military coup which, in September 1930, overturned 
the institutional order established by the Constitution 
of 1853-1860. He was appointed Undersecretary of 
Finance by General José Felix Uriburu, who had been 
installed by the revolution as provisional President 
of the Republic. From that position, Prebisch was 
able to make radical changes in fi scal arrangements, 
which had revolved around the taxation of overseas 
trade since 1809, when the last Viceroy of Rio de 
la Plata had opened the future Argentina to world 
commerce and thus set it on the road that until 1929 
took it to ever loftier heights. What Prebisch did was to 
introduce the income tax. For decades there had been 
a broad consensus that this was necessary and yet two 
Argentine presidents had failed, under the constitutional 
framework, to secure congressional support for it. With 
the suspension of that framework by the revolution’s 
victory, that obstacle was gone: having obtained 
General Uruburu’s authorization to prepare the draft 
bill on a Friday afternoon, Prebisch put it together 
over a weekend of feverish work, and by the following 
Monday it was the law of the land.4
Such experiences might understandably give 
Prebisch some concern over the impact that the 
imminent return to representative institutions might 
have on his plans for even more radical changes. Yet 
for some years this concern seemed to have been totally 
unjustifi ed. Indeed, after some initial hesitation, General 
Agustin B. Justo, who as constitutional President 
faced the challenge of governing a country that was 
hopelessly divided by the experience of living under 
a military regime (a regime which, in bequeathing 
4 Raúl Prebisch Foundation (1991, vol. I, p. 349).
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him power, also bequeathed him the overwhelming 
unpopularity that had led to its demise), accepted the 
far-reaching reforms included in the economic plan 
prepared by his ministers of agriculture and fi nance, 
with the coaching of Prebisch, and went on to secure 
its approval by a Congress that, restored in 1932, was 
embarking on one of the most brilliant chapters of its 
entire history.
But this admirable parliamentary performance was 
facilitated by the boycott called by the party that had 
been overthrown in 1930, in response to the deliberately 
humiliating conditions that the military authorities had 
imposed as a condition for its return to the electoral 
arena. The Radical Party’s decision in 1935 to rejoin 
national affairs was enough to reveal just how artifi cial 
this happy experience was. Although the political forces 
holding the reins of government owed their position to 
the Radicals’ boycott of the electoral arena, that party 
still maintained its majority status despite having lost 
power. The governing forces showed themselves ever 
more determined to retain power, resorting increasingly 
to electoral fraud. Factional tensions that until 1935 had 
remained beneath the surface now erupted violently. 
The reform phase of the Justo government came to an 
abrupt end in 1936 in a huge parliamentary scandal, 
in which some of the sponsors of its initiatives were 
the target of accusations that, while never proven, were 
(and are still today) widely accepted by public opinion. 
That reaction is understandable, since (though phrased 
in the language of slander and insult) those allegations 
voiced the frustration felt by the majority parties that 
had been thrust aside by the regime reinstated in 
1932—a regime that held power and was governing 
the Argentine economy only because the citizens had 
been humiliatingly stripped of their right to freely elect 
their governors.
In the midst of the political and institutional 
collapse of the regime emerging from this incomplete 
constitutional restoration, the management of the 
institutions created in 1935 to handle the new economic 
and fi nancial functions of the State lost nothing of its 
original effectiveness. Indeed, it was rewarded by the 
success with which Argentina coped with the challenges 
posed by the Second World War, different but no less 
severe than those sparked by the economic crisis. Yet 
this did not save those institutions from the growing 
disrepute of the regime that had created them, and of 
which they were still a part. It was not surprising, then, 
that four short months after 4 June 1943, when the now 
terminally vitiated constitutional order was toppled by a 
military coup headed by General Pedro Pablo Ramirez 
(who had been Minister of War in the government 
he overthrew), that General, now President of the 
Republic, signed a degree dismissing Raúl Prebisch 
and putting an end to his career in Argentina.
One aspect of this stage of his career warrants 
further attention, not only because it contributed 
decisively to the dismal anticlimax that ended years 
of growing success, but also because, in a narrower 
scenario, it hints at what would happen during a more 
complex career in ECLAC. We already noted that 
Prebisch saw an essential difference between what he 
and his group were trying to accomplish and Schacht’s 
contribution to the impressive revival of the German 
economy in the fi rst fi ve years of Hitler’s regime. To 
this it must be added that his rejection of any affi nity 
with Schacht’s work refl ected something more than 
his abhorrence of the regime to which the German 
economist had devoted his formidable talents as a 
fi nancial wizard. Schacht, after all, had at his disposal 
the admirably efficient institutional, economic and 
fi nancial apparatus of the State which the new regime 
had just taken over. By contrast, Prebisch and his 
group had been obliged to create such an apparatus 
from scratch, and had done so masterfully, but their 
approach had more in common with that of the grands 
commis d’État and their retinue of the mercantilist era. 
He also shared with them a trait that had become even 
more prominent in the Iberian version of this current, 
which reached the apogee of its infl uence under the 
banner of enlightened despotism. At that time, the 
monarch’s fi nancial policy advisers did not confi ne 
their ambitions to securing the resources needed to 
defend Spain’s place on the international chessboard. 
They also believed they could use the power of the 
absolute State to imprint a new profi le on Spanish 
society. Prebisch and his entourage implicitly shared 
this premise, without realizing how anachronistic it 
was becoming in a swiftly modernizing society and in 
a context of representative democracy. This unperceived 
anachronism did much to explain both the futility of the 
group’s efforts in the 1920s and the painful outcome of 
the following stage, when it owed its leading place to a 
regime that survived only through brazen subversion of 
the democratic system that had been formally restored 
in 1932.
But what was anachronistic in Argentina, which 
from 1912 to 1930 had elected its governors in fully 
competitive and honestly tallied elections, was not 
anachronistic in most of the rest of Ibero-America, 
where the crisis had sparked similar problems to those 
confronting Argentina. Financial and economic circles 
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in the rest of the subcontinent had been following with 
growing interest the new institutional framework that 
was allowing the Argentine government to address 
these challenges with notable success. In particular, it 
would not be anachronistic for another half-century in 
Mexico, where Prebisch (barely three months after his 
dismissal as Governor of the Central Bank of Argentina, 
on 17 October 1943) engaged with his Mexican central 
banking counterparts in a “round of discussions”, in 
which he would try to draw from his experience “some 
positive lessons for monetary and fi nancial policy”. 
The invitation to discuss this topic with his Mexican 
peers refl ected (as Celso Furtado recalled in 1985) the 
international admiration that his work had earned for 
the Central Bank of Argentina, and it is no surprise 
the discussions that closed each of his six lengthy 
and dense presentations refl ected his listeners’ interest 
in the practical operation of the complex financial 
mechanisms that had allowed the Argentine State to act 
so effi ciently in this new framework. But though this 
was his colleagues’ main concern, Prebisch already had 
a different one. As he stated in his initial presentation, 
the fi rst “positive lesson” he drew from his experience 
was that, while the lead players had “frequently been 
barely within the limits of sound monetary doctrine […] 
we must ask if that sound doctrine was really sound for 
us, if it really responded to the nature and structure of 
the Argentine economy.” And he wondered, “Has the 
time not come to formulate our own principles, derived 
precisely from our reality, and to develop our own 
sound doctrine, taking and adapting everything that is 
useful from general principles to establish a national 
monetary policy?”
Prebisch explained, in terms that leave no room for 
doubt, why he looked back at his Argentine experience 
from a different perspective from that of his Mexican 
colleagues: it was now time for him (though not for 
them) “to examine the events from afar without any 
need for immediate action, to judge them with a critical 
spirit and an overall vision, and to extract positive 
lessons for monetary and f inancial policy”.5 The 
sober tone in which Prebisch referred to the painful 
episode that had recently stripped him of the position 
he had devoted two decades to achieving in Argentina 
refl ects more than a scruple for elegance. If he could 
form a retrospective balance that reflected neither 
rancour nor nostalgia, it was above all because he had 
now discovered the path he must pursue. He took the 
5 Raúl Prebisch Foundation (1992, vol. III, p. 1).
fi rst step in that direction when, looking anew at the 
experiment that had ended in this abrupt anticlimax, 
he asked whether the successes he had reaped from 
it were not in fact a reward for his readiness to stray 
from “sound monetary doctrine” whenever warranted 
by circumstances. This was a question that he and the 
ministers he advised had refused to entertain while 
they participated in that experiment. Usually, he had 
defended his unorthodox decisions against those 
who could see no positive outcome to them with the 
argument that the dominant countries in the world 
trading system had not hesitated to use their power 
to restructure trade along lines far removed from 
“sound doctrine”, and in this way to shift onto their 
weaker trading partners a disproportionate share of 
the fallout from the crisis. Consequently, Argentina, 
which accounted for no more than 2% of the total 
value of international trade, and therefore had very 
little infl uence on its new confi guration, could not avoid 
making changes to its monetary and fi nancial policy. 
Although they might be condemned from the viewpoint 
of “sound doctrine”, those changes had in fact proven 
essential for preventing this newly emerging mercantile 
order from wreaking all its destructive potential on the 
national economy.
Only when circumstances permitted —or, more 
accurately, obliged— Prebisch to “examine from afar” 
this stage in which he had played a leading role, would 
he cease to see that new mercantile order as a given that 
it would be pointless to debate, and recognize it as a 
problem instead. But neither in his presentations at the 
Bank of Mexico nor in his contribution to the seminar 
on Latin America hosted at that time by the Colegio 
de México did Prebisch go into the specifi c modalities 
with which this problem would have to be addressed in 
Latin America. What was new in his ideas was that he 
no longer felt obliged to present the innovations he had 
helped introduce in Argentina as necessary adjustments 
to a highly abnormal situation, justifi ed only for as long 
as that situation persisted. Rather, he portrayed them 
as a refl ection of a more mature attitude to economic 
doctrines that were not rejected but that, even after the 
emergency has passed, still had to serve “the goals or 
objectives we are pursuing”.
He proposed that the countries of Latin America 
pursue those goals by jumping uninvited into the 
debate among the imminent victors of the Second 
World War on the future role of the gold standard in 
the monetary system that would govern the post-war 
world. They would be able to invoke their experience, 
which taught that “the gold standard, as we have seen 
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it function, does not allow us to achieve” those goals 
and objectives. Yet Prebisch did not propose that they 
should oppose, on that basis of that experience, the 
return to a monetary standard that had “much that 
was good”. It would be suffi cient to “use it better, 
learning from the lessons of past experience” which 
suggested “stripping it of its excessively automatic 
operation and supplementing it with other features 
that have proven effective”.
Viewed in this way, national economic and 
financial policymakers everywhere would be well 
advised to distance themselves from “sound doctrine”. 
He stated this explicitly in a 1948 paper, which left no 
doubt that his objections to classical doctrines were 
directed less at what they taught than at the attitude that 
inspired them. He did not deny that classical economists 
carried “logical reasoning to its extreme, and later 
they enlisted mathematics to give to all this theoretical 
structure a rigour, a precision, and a scientifi c elegance 
that it had hitherto lacked”, but he saw in this a victory 
purchased at too high a price: “the more they reasoned, 
the more they removed the body of doctrine from the 
living reality […] of the real world that economics was 
supposed to explain, in order to give us the means to 
act upon it”.
Of course he mentioned that this “living reality” 
was that of “our countries”, and he added that “to 
prepare our own ideas and to develop a national 
economic policy adapted to them” it would be useful 
to compare notes with “other similar countries”. But 
he did not yet go so far as to outline the problematic 
aspects of the relationship between those seeking to 
secure for “our countries” a tolerable place in the new 
and inhospitable post-Depression mercantile order, 
and the doctrines emanating from the central core of 
the economic system enveloping them. Although that 
centre had been more severely devastated by the crisis 
than the Latin American periphery of the system, it 
still wielded power as it groped towards an exit from 
the ruins, and it would be illusory to think it would 
refrain from using that power to protect its interests at 
the expense of the periphery.
None of this was yet present in Prebisch’s 
propositions, but there was something perhaps more 
important. Although he had not so much as sketched 
the stance Latin America should adopt in the coming 
debate, he had already decided that the region must 
insist upon its right to participate in it. This effectively 
def ined the direction that his career would take 
thereafter. As we know, this new stage began with 
a victory even more spectacular than those that had 
crowned his previous work, since he was to make 
the newly established ECLAC into an instrument that 
would allow Latin America’s representatives to take part 
in the debate on the course of the world economy in 
the wake of history’s most terrible war. In retrospect, 
it is easy to understand that this plan faced formidable 
obstacles; for its success made one of the fi rst cracks 
in the bipolar structure that the two rival coalitions 
recently formed by the victors in the great confl ict were 
determined to impose on the entire planet.
In this eminently political undertaking, Prebisch 
fell back on what he had learned from his previous 
experience as an observer and a participant in the 
labyrinthine accords and disaccords among those who 
were steering the course of a crisis-devastated economy 
from the commanding heights. Celso Furtado has 
given us, in “A fantasia organizada”, an unforgettable 
vignette of Prebisch at his moment of triumph. He had 
just received from Getulio Vargas, recently returned to 
the presidency of Brazil, the support that (together with 
that of Mexico and Chile) would allow him to take 
ECLAC in the direction he wanted, and his comments 
reflect an admiration for the Brazilian leader that 
Furtado fi nds excessive. What Prebisch saw in Vargas, 
above all, was a statesman who never fl agged in his 
effort to give the Brazilian State the mechanisms that 
would impress new effi ciency on its performance in the 
economic and fi nancial fi eld, while steering a political 
process even more tormented and convulsive than 
that of contemporary Argentina. Furtado complains 
of Prebisch’s blindness to other, less positive aspects 
of the Vargas regime (a blindness that Prebisch shares 
with many other Argentines), and attributes this to 
a conviction that the world was living in an age of 
dictatorship, in which the best that could be hoped for 
was enlightened despotism. Whether Prebisch’s attitude 
refl ected that conviction or the lessons of Argentina’s 
experience (which seemed to suggest that the changes 
to which he had devoted his life were harder to 
introduce in democracy), he certainly did not regret 
that his recent change of fortune, in other respects so 
harsh, could restore him to those commanding heights, 
where the disruptive infl uence of democratic politics 
was hardly felt, and where his native instincts had 
always allowed him to navigate with rare skill.
What Prebisch admired most about Vargas was 
the care he took to endow the Brazilian State with an 
institutional apparatus that would serve it effi ciently 
in the new activities opening up in the economic and 
social sphere. That admiration foreshadowed some 
of the criteria that Prebisch would use at the helm 
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of ECLAC: his first priority would be to give the 
recently created agency the institutional soundness and 
operational effectiveness that had marked his handiwork 
in his native country. What made it easier was that 
this time his locus was in Chile. One of the keys to 
both the brilliant successes and the sad anticlimax 
of his Argentine career was that his capacity for 
creating solid and effective institutions was completely 
exceptional in a country where the need for such 
virtues was seldom recognized, and in the end it was 
not appreciated enough to protect him. Chile, on the 
other hand, prided itself, and not without reason, on 
having a sharper institutional sense than any other 
Hispanic-American nation. In this more hospitable 
domestic climate, ECLAC was not to only survive 
amid political cataclysms of overwhelming intensity, 
but would constitute the nucleus from which other 
research and educational institutions would emerge, 
and they too would prove capable of surviving the 
direst adversities.
In this more propitious setting Prebisch, now 
turning 50, was able to repeat the feat that had launched 
his Argentine career three decades earlier. And Joseph 
Hodara (whose work, Prebisch y la CEPAL, offers 
the passionate testimony of someone who has lived 
the experience he narrates) is surely right when he 
indicates that, now as then, the secret of Prebisch’s 
success as a builder of institutions is that in them the 
institutional bond is reinforced by the charismatic ties 
among the people recruited for an undertaking that 
seeks not only to advance knowledge but to transform 
the reality it explores. Thirty years earlier Prebisch had 
been able to lean on pre-existing ties as he enlisted his 
classmates in a collective project that he proposed as a 
life undertaking for them all, and enshrine himself as 
the primus inter pares in that group. Now, as Hodara 
again tells us, Prebisch was surrounded by a group 
that came into being solely in response to his call to 
work on an agenda that evoked “ardent enthusiasm 
among a young generation of economists determined to 
observe the evolution and practice of development from 
within, without regard to accidents of nationality”, and 
that group recognized him as “a master who inspired 
reverence by his style, his energy and his age”. In its 
members he commanded a “compulsive loyalty and 
an almost apostolic devotion”6 even more intense than 
he had evoked when both the leader and his followers 
were barely beyond adolescence.
6  Hodara (1987, p. 11 ).
Nor do I believe that Hodara was mistaken when 
he relates the bond that Prebisch had forged with his 
collaborators to make the Commission “a charismatic 
island within a frankly bureaucratic landscape”, with 
what could be called the hybrid nature of its relationship 
with economics. On one hand, his leadership bears 
traces of the “profound wellsprings of the Latin 
American cultural and institutional tradition”, while the 
“particular style” with which he exercises it perpetuates 
in some respects that of those two very traditional 
fi gures of the Latin American scene, the caudillo and 
the thinker.7 But even in his Argentine phase he had 
been a prime mover in professionalizing the social 
sciences, a process that banished forever “the image 
and the working method of the traditional thinker”; 
now, in ECLAC he was going to reap “the fruits of 
that process and hasten it substantially, particularly in 
the economics fi eld”.8
For this reason, the entourage attracted to ECLAC 
by his inspiration and teaching would fi nd in both a 
dual validation of the undertaking for which he had 
assembled them. On one hand, with this project they 
were again taking up an illustrious and deeply rooted 
Ibero-American intellectual tradition; on the other, 
they spearheaded the effort to equip the aspiring 
champions of Latin America with the scientifi c and 
technical skills that would give them full rights to take 
part in advancing the social sciences, of which they 
had for too long been distant spectators. There was 
something in Prebisch’s ideas that made it easier to 
integrate both sources of validation: from the legacy 
of the thinker came both the fi rmness with which he 
demanded the status of social science for economics 
and the insistence that practical economics could 
transform reality. Both these traits could be seen in 
the stamp that Prebisch placed from the outset of his 
career on his efforts to enhance the scientifi c standards 
of the economic research that he would direct. This 
was strongly empirical: as early as 1921, while still 
referring only to university, he complained of “the old 
spirit of teaching”, entrusted to professors who “read, 
assimilate, synthesize and repeat theories, and even 
refute some of them”, whereas what was needed is 
to “study objectively the facts of our economic life”, 
something that required “searching and selecting data 
from among complex reports and statistics, examining 
them in detail, and organizing them”.9
7 Hodara (1987, p. 12).
8 Hodara (1987, p. 34).
9 Raúl Prebisch Foundation (1991, vol. I, p. 64).
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We have already seen how, in 1948, he remained 
fi rmly committed to this principle. He therefore lost 
interest in developments in economic theory which, in 
his view, “strayed too far from the real world, which 
economics was supposed to explain in order to give 
us the means to act upon it”. This distancing does not 
betray any ambition to replace the theoretical tools 
developed in the great centres of economic knowledge 
with other tools forged from concrete Latin American 
experience. On this point his attitude still refl ected that 
adopted a century earlier by Juan Bautista Alberdi, 
who incarnated more than anyone in Argentina the 
fi gure of the thinker. Indeed, when Prebisch claimed 
the right “for us to have our own sound doctrine, and 
to use and adapt everything that is useful from general 
principles”, he invited Latin Americans (just as Alberdi 
did in 1837) to distance themselves from Europe as a 
teacher. He continued to recognize the Old World as 
the irreplaceable source of those general principles, but 
at the same time he assumed the supplementary and 
no less indispensable task of selecting and adapting 
from those principles what was useful for analysing 
the realities he wanted to transform in practice.
This measured distancing seems all the more 
reasonable because the juncture at which economics 
now found itself as a discipline seemed to suggest 
that it might be the right approach even for those 
pursuing it within those great centres. In effect, in 
the revision of economics proposed by Keynes, the 
practical consequences were much more radical 
than the theoretical innovations, which merely made 
superfi cial adjustments to the majestic architecture of 
the neoclassical doctrines and (like Prebisch) did so 
with the benefi t of practical experience accumulated by 
someone who since 1918 had followed the economic 
process from what were still the “commanding heights” 
for the entire planet. This circumstance meant that 
the frontier between theoretical elaboration and the 
analysis of concrete economic processes lost something 
of its original clarity, and despite the caution Prebisch 
observed whenever he ventured to draw general 
conclusions from specifi c analysis there were growing 
ranks of critics who saw behind such analysis the 
infl uence of a doctrine that was there even if only as a 
spectre. These complaints accused ECLAC of straying 
ever further from the neutral information mandate that 
the United Nations had set for its regional commissions 
and they were suffi ciently well-founded that the same 
people who, in the name of the institution, denied them 
any validity fi nd it more fl attering than problematic 
that Albert Hirschman recognized the paper on “The 
Economic Development of Latin America and Its 
Principal Problems” (1949) as constituting the “Latin 
American Manifesto” that Prebisch certainly intended 
it to be.10 
That paper, in which ECLAC spoke out in 
debates over the future path of economics for the fi rst 
time, showed some signs that the attempt at a unifi ed 
diagnosis of the problems that integration into the post-
war economic order was posing for all of Latin America 
must have been infl uenced by previous experience in 
a narrower framework. Thus, although in the report 
that Hirschman called the “Latin American Manifesto” 
Prebisch constantly stressed the specifi c modalities 
with which these problems appeared in each national 
context, the fact remains that he presented them as 
variations on a theme in which one of those national 
experiences —not surprisingly, that of Argentina—
clearly stood front and centre. It is easy to recognize 
this, for example, in the central role that he assigned 
to the transit from a global system centred on Great 
Britain to one revolving around the United States, 
which meant that in some passages the anti-imperialist 
message that some complained of appeared to refl ect 
instead a state of mind akin to that denounced in India 
at that time as nostalgia for the days of the Raj. But 
what was here a problem of nuance took on much 
broader consequences when, from its base in Santiago, 
ECLAC began to develop a more detailed picture of the 
process experienced by the Latin American economy in 
the twentieth century in which (again not surprisingly) 
Argentina and Chile occupied centre-stage.
From the perspective of this southern extremity 
of South America, the narrative focused on the 
difficult transition between a period of “outward-
oriented growth”, rapid economic expansion based on 
agricultural and mining exports (which were already 
losing steam when the 1929 crash triggered the collapse 
of the world economic order that had made it possible) 
and one of “inward-oriented growth”, in which the 
leading role was played by industrialization based on 
the substitution of imported consumer goods, which 
the sharp decline in exports sparked by the crisis had 
placed beyond the reach of these economies. The 
paper also stressed how much this transition had been 
facilitated by the creation, during the previous period 
of export-led prosperity, of a broad consumer market 
for those now unaffordable goods, and of transportation 
and marketing networks that were readily available 
10  Gurrieri (1982, vol. I , p. 14).
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for the goods that would now replace them. On this 
point, the problem ascribed to Latin America was 
based mainly on the experience of Argentina. On the 
other hand, the adverse consequences attributed to 
the contrast between sectors of the national economy 
with productivity levels that were close to being 
internationally competitive and other, much broader 
sectors with extremely low productivity related mainly 
to Chilean agriculture, which was criticized for being so 
outmoded that high protective barriers were needed to 
keep it alive, and for affording rural populations such a 
low standard of living that domestic demand could not 
expand rapidly enough to provide the desired stimulus 
for industrialization.
The aspects of Latin American reality that occupy 
the central place in these fi rst diagnoses by ECLAC did 
not, of course, apply only to this southern corner of the 
region. They extended well beyond it, in confi gurations 
suffi ciently distinct from those of the South that no one 
should be surprised by the differences of stress and 
nuance between these ECLAC diagnoses and the one 
that Arthur Lewis was then beginning to sketch out 
from his Caribbean perspective. This other diagnosis, 
based on a partially different perspective, did not 
invalidate those offered by ECLAC from a decidedly 
“Southern Cone” viewpoint, but we must recognize 
that it was the latter one that affected the direction 
the Commission’s thinking was to take when, starting 
from what were essentially assessments of the recent 
past, ECLAC set out to formulate proposals with a 
view to the future.
When this happened, the Commission’s necessarily 
cautious institutional interventions were to be 
accompanied by more explicit ones arising from the 
constellation of academic institutions springing up 
around it. The profi le of the personnel of these new 
establishments refl ected the criteria that guided their 
recruitment, wherein economics was viewed, above 
all, as a social science with the exquisitely practical 
purpose of guiding society in its efforts to transform 
itself. This explains why Prebisch was so eager to 
bring to ECLAC the Spanish sociologist José Medina 
Echevarría, whom he enlisted from the ranks of 
Republican exiles in Mexico. Only two years younger 
than Prebisch and, like him, quickly recognized in 
this new fi eld as “a teacher who inspired reverence 
by his style, his energy and his age”, Echevarría, a 
convinced social democrat, laid the primary blame for 
the catastrophic turn taken by European history after the 
First World War on the path down which Lenin had led 
the Socialist movement, a movement which —although 
this could not have been its original intention— had 
shown itself by then capable of promoting gradual 
changes in the balance of social forces and held the 
promise of other, more far-reaching changes. Faced 
with this reformist current, Lenin had not been content 
to propose a return to the revolutionary sources of 
Marxist socialism, but handed the leadership of the 
movement in this new stage to a fresh collective player, 
a “party of a new kind” that in Russia was embodied 
by the Bolsheviks. Thereafter the rekindled class war 
had yielded a succession of increasingly catastrophic 
upheavals, which had begun in Europe with the triumph 
of fascism in Italy in 1922, and had led in Spain, after 
three years of savage civil war, to the outcome that 
drove so many Spanish intellectuals to seek new roots 
in the Hispanic-American world in 1939.
This vision, which made explicit the assumptions 
that had instinctively guided Prebisch from the 
beginning of his career, would turn out to be prophetic, 
in that it anticipated the coming changes in both the 
political and the socio-economic context of Latin 
America and the world. Those changes vindicated the 
Commission’s ideas, rescuing them from the marginal 
status they had managed to achieve since its foundation, 
to such an extent that 10 years later those ideas 
seemed to have attracted nearly universal consensus. 
But they were soon to face a decidedly inhospitable 
climate during the no less savage political upheavals 
and social confl icts that would follow this brief season 
of fl eeting hopes. As the 1950s advanced, it became 
increasingly clear that what in the Old World had 
begun as an unexpectedly successful post-war economic 
reconstruction was continuing on a worldwide scale 
in a wave of growth with no foreseeable end. This 
climate of growing optimism about the future was 
quite appropriate as the culminating phase of the 
“trente glorieuses” approached—those “30 glorious 
years” following 1945, which the French economist 
Jean Fourastié would recall nostalgically in 1979 as 
the golden age of the capitalist order, whose survival 
had aroused well-founded doubts half a century earlier, 
but which now seemed to be promising an ever more 
brilliant future.
But it was not only the capitalist order that seemed 
to hold this promise. Until 1960, the economy of 
the Socialist bloc had been growing even faster than 
that of the countries hitched to capitalism, and many 
concluded from this that both blocs were coming to 
grips successfully with the shared problem of economic 
development. So much so, that in 1960 Walt W. Rostow, 
in his “non-Communist manifesto” (The Stages of 
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Economic Growth) imbued with the spirit of the Cold 
War, presented the Soviet Union’s triumphant entry into 
the era of self-sustained development as the culmination 
of a process that had begun under capitalism in the 
empire of the czars. A sign of this reborn confi dence in 
the future was the willingness to wager on it with the 
formulation of what (after that confi dence evaporated) 
came to be described —and condemned— as “grand 
narratives”, which looked to this mystery-free future for 
the key to reconstructing the past. (After a long century 
in which greater caution had reigned here, this was an 
aspect that the “non-Communist manifesto” of 1960 
picked up on from the Communist manifesto of 1848). 
Narratives like Rostow’s offered grounds for celebration 
to societies that were coming to be known as the “fi rst 
world”, to which the future promised further progress 
and constantly rising prosperity, but read from Latin 
America they seemed to herald, not without anxiety, the 
mortal challenges that the region would face in that all-
important transition. Hence the new-found confi dence 
in the future underpinning these narratives inspired in 
what would soon be known as “ECLAC thinking” an 
ambition to decipher the enigmas of the past.
If there were grounds for anxiety, it was not 
because Latin America’s growth was lagging behind 
the first world —in the second half of the 1950s 
Brazil’s rate of growth was the highest anywhere 
outside the Socialist orbit, and in the fi rst two decades 
after the Second World War even Argentina’s lustreless 
performance produced a growth rate slightly higher 
than that of the United States. Rather it was because 
not even these growth rates, which would be hard to 
surpass, were enough to signifi cantly reduce the gap that 
separated Latin America from the developed world.
Because of this recognition of the way things 
were, the dual perspective toward the past and future 
(an essential feature of development economics), would 
take a different slant in “ECLAC thinking”, distinct 
from that of economists in the developed world. In a 
Latin America that was beginning to recognize itself as 
part of the Third World, examination of the past started 
from the future —whose positive signs were less a sure 
promise than an inescapable imperative— and stretched 
back far beyond the brief interval that separates the 
present from the beginnings and flowering of the 
Industrial Revolution, to discover in more remote ages 
the reasons why, in the era of development, it remained 
so hard to make up Latin America’s ingrained lag. In 
1958 and in 1959 two books by ECLAC undertook this 
exploration by two different routes. In Chile, un caso 
de desarrollo frustrado (“Chile, a case of frustrated 
development”), Aníbal Pinto Santa Cruz recast in the 
vocabulary of development economics some ideas and 
diagnoses matured in a long century of thinking about 
this lag. He especially praised the ideas of Francisco 
Encina and constantly acknowledged his debt to that 
author’s work, Nuestra inferioridad económica, sus 
causas, sus consecuencias, (“Our economic inferiority, 
its causes and its consequences”), published in 1912. 
Encina’s works abound in intuitions of which some 
are admirably penetrating and others excessively 
arbitrary, but there is no doubt that Santa Cruz found 
in them a very useful inventory of issues that had to 
be tackled by any scholar wishing to tackle the old 
yet ever new problem of Latin America’s lagging 
performance. In A formação econômica do Brasil 
(“The economic formation of Brazil”), Celso Furtado 
took a different road: he used the tools of retrospective 
economic analysis to try to pinpoint the time at which 
the economies of English-speaking and Portuguese-
speaking America began to diverge. He found it in 
the decades between the independence of the United 
States and that of Brazil, and he also demonstrated 
that, although Brazil’s growth rates were thereafter 
again comparable with those of the United States, 
the gap that had opened up at that time would not be 
closed. He reached the same conclusion for Mexico 
and Spanish-speaking South America. It is tempting 
to conclude from this that the earlier independence of 
the United States gave that country something more 
than a chronological leg-up, by allowing it to become 
an independent participant in the Atlantic economy 
before the advance of the Industrial Revolution opened 
a gulf between its centre and the periphery, to which 
the new Iberian nations found themselves relegated 
from their beginnings.
While these perspectives developed in ECLAC 
made a signif icant contribution to contemporary 
thinking about the issues and methodologies of the 
social sciences, which in those years were attracting 
increasing attention in Latin America, they also 
began to have an infl uence in the realm of day-to-day 
politics. Evidence of this was seen in the mid-1950s, 
when the term desarrollismo (“developmentism”) 
appeared in the political vocabulary, and on its heels 
a recognition that Latin America’s post-war political 
and social climate differed vastly from the conditions 
that had prevailed between the outbreak of the Great 
Depression and the end of the Second World War. In 
that earlier time Prebisch had been able to infl uence 
the course of Argentina’s economy, for the two reasons 
indicated above —on one hand, the proven incapacity 
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of the market economy’s automatic mechanisms to end 
a deepening crisis meant that interests traditionally 
opposed to State intervention in the economy now 
turned to the government in desperation, while at the 
same time the establishment of a new political order, 
however shaky, had done away with universal suffrage 
and had severely confined the manoeuvring room 
of labour and social movements, with an analogous 
effect in those sectors. By contrast, by the post-war 
era, the situation had changed radically in the fi rst 
aspect, with consequences that were being felt as well 
in the second.
With the economic upheavals triggered in 1929 
behind them, Prebisch and the ministers he advised 
had been able argue in 1935 that their efforts to boost 
industry were driven not by ideological or doctrinaire 
leanings but by the recognition that this was the only 
way under the circumstances for Argentina to make up 
some of the ground it had lost. And when the victors of 
the Second World War made it one of their objectives to 
restore the global market, which in fact had ceased to 
function in 1929, it seemed once again quite feasible, as 
an alternative to the model improvised over the previous 
decade and a half, to go back to the one that had served 
Argentina so well for more than a century.
This alternative took shape most clearly in 
Argentina but gained a greater or lesser hold virtually 
throughout Latin America, and had a political impact 
that, among the larger countries, could only be 
effectively blunted in Mexico (which from the 
beginning of its revolution followed its own path 
in this respect). Those not prepared to renounce 
the economic and social changes made during the 
previous stage were obliged to rally support for the 
industrialization model from a broader public than 
the owners of industry. Hence the rise of political 
currents that later came to be called “populist”, which 
sought to win the support of the urban masses for the 
industrialization alternative as a counterweight to the 
growing reluctance of the propertied classes. This shift 
consolidated and accentuated the features that, from 
their beginning, differentiated the social framework 
of the industrialization taking place in Latin America 
from that of the earlier Industrial Revolution in the 
first world. For one thing, there was now a labour 
movement in place, and the populist solution would 
help it to progress. There were already hints (and 
sometimes more) of labour laws which, in a populist 
political setting, could not fail to have a growing 
infl uence on the day-to-day lives of the working class. 
All of this would merely worsen the diffi culties of an 
industrialization effort that could no longer benefi t, 
as it had during the war, from the absence of all 
competition from the developed world. But even more 
serious was the fact that 10 years after the end of the 
war this industrialization model (based on producing 
mass consumption goods mainly for the middle and 
working classes) was exhausting its growth potential. 
It is not surprising, then, that the political movements 
identifi ed with the industrialization alternative felt the 
need to breathe new life into it, and this need drove the 
rise of what came to be known as “desarrollismo”.
The term alluded to the idea of opening a new 
phase in which the industrialization process would 
be deepened. As originally conceived in ECLAC, it 
would have to address the production of capital and 
intermediate goods once light industry had grown 
suffi ciently to create a broad market for such products. 
The political leaders who adopted this attractive label 
for their plans started this new phase by promoting 
the production of durable consumer goods targeted 
at the upper and upper-middle classes. It is easy to 
see why they did so, since the serious and imminent 
threat to their supporters represented by the industrial 
sector’s incipient stagnation enhanced the attractiveness 
of offers by f irst-world corporations, hungry for 
the monopoly rents that were there for the picking 
in industrial economies closed to any signif icant 
external competition. But while this strategy rapidly 
permitted the hoped-for industrial revival able to 
restore the original drive to the populist movements, 
it was not long before the innovations made to give 
those movements a new lease of life were opening 
the door to changes in the socio-economic framework 
that had facilitated the previous advance of populism. 
This happened for two reasons that ultimately fuelled 
each other. On one hand, local production in these 
new branches of industry, far from replacing imports 
which had in fact been virtually suspended for decades, 
was creating a need for new and different imports. 
This meant constant resort to external investment 
and credit and, consequently, increasingly limited the 
decision-making freedom of economic policymakers 
in the receiving nation. On the other hand, the fact 
that these new industries (whose growth contrasted 
with the stagnation of the older industries that catered 
to an already saturated mass lower- and lower-middle 
class market) could survive and even prosper amidst 
an income redistribution pattern contrary to that which 
the populists had originally intended helped to weaken 
the political power of a movement that in 1945 believed 
the future belonged to it.
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By the end of the 1950s, both external and 
domestic forces were becoming increasingly effective 
in countering the populists and their supporters and 
this was refl ected in an ongoing struggle over income 
distribution among the social sectors, interrupted by 
truces that were doomed to be shattered as soon as a 
new burst of infl ation made them obsolete. This led to 
fear that what had been hailed as an admittedly diffi cult 
transition between two industrial models would end 
up in stagnation and instability that would drag on 
indefi nitely. In the context of a rapidly growing world 
economy, with which Latin America was fi nding it 
increasingly diffi cult to keep pace, it became clear that 
in order to avoid chronic stagnation deeper changes 
were needed in the region’s economic and social 
structures than those introduced under the banner of 
populism. In 1958 the Commission produced an essay 
describing this broadening of perspectives, one that 
resonated far and wide. In La infl ación chilena, un 
enfoque heterodoxo (“Chilean infl ation, a heterodox 
approach”), Osvaldo Sunkel called for “lifting the 
monetary veil” to discover the structural causes of 
infl ation, which he attributed to the damaging economic 
and social consequences of the low productivity of 
Chilean agriculture, as mentioned above. This was at 
fi rst glance a rather arbitrary conclusion, since industry 
suffered similar constraints, but it was justified by 
Sunkel’s proposal to go beyond that diagnosis and 
suggest a way to overcome the impasse in the Chilean 
economy through a deep-reaching economic and social 
reform, which could only start with agriculture.
In 1959 the triumph of the Cuban revolution had 
the immediate effect of rallying a Latin American 
consensus around the more ambitious agenda that 
was beginning to take shape. By 1961, that agenda 
was drawing murmurs of approval from Washington. 
This agreement on the basic socio-economic problems 
of Latin America lasted longer than might have been 
imagined possible when Latin America was becoming 
a battleground for the Cold War, which had been exiled 
from the developed world and was preparing to bloody 
the farthest reaches of the Third World. Shortly after 
his victory, Fidel Castro launched an idea that was 
then taken up by Brazilian President Kubitschek in 
his proposed “Operation Pan-American”. This was 
ultimately given shape in the Alliance for Progress, 
which the United States would offer its southern 
neighbours as an alternative to the socialist path that 
Cuba was championing.
In 1960 this consensus, which essentially mirrored 
the Commission’s thinking, seemed to be on the 
ascendant everywhere. While in Cuba, with the coaching 
of Felipe Pazos, the attempt to overcome stagnation and 
expand the narrow domestic market through a huge 
boost in mass consumption capacity gained for a time 
almost unanimous support for the revolutionary regime 
from Cuban society, in Chile the Christian Democrats 
came to power in 1964 with a programme that refl ected 
the essence of ECLAC thinking, defeating a leftist, 
similarly inspired alternative. In fact, the Alliance for 
Progress had now adopted as key themes the agrarian 
and fi scal reforms that Prebisch had proposed to his 
followers back in 1922.
As we know, things were soon to take a different 
turn. Why was the shift that Lenin had introduced in the 
socialist movement, and which Medina Echevarría had 
thought so catastrophic for the Old World, now having 
repercussions in the new? Certainly, that shift can be 
blamed for much of what was tragic in the stage that 
began with the defeat in Latin America of revolutionary 
and reformist movements alike, from the overthrow of 
Brazilian President João Goulart in 1964 (the same 
year in which the Christian Democrats launched their 
“Revolution in Freedom” in Chile), to the removal of 
Maria Estela Martinez de Perón in Argentina in 1976. 
But we must ask if there were not other problems 
that had less to do with the contents of the ECLAC 
project than with where it came from, and which would 
also explain the ultimately insurmountable problems 
involved in putting it into practice.
Celso Furtado offers moving testimony in the 
three books that trace his career, from A Fantasia 
organizada, covering the hopeful years at ECLAC, to 
the increasingly sombre A Fantasia desfeita and Os 
ares do mundo. This is the testimony of one who, alone 
among Prebisch’s recruits to ECLAC, rose to occupy 
in his native country a position comparable to the one 
that Prebisch had held in Argentina, only to discover 
that it was now impossible to steer the economic and 
social process from that position, as Prebisch had been 
able to do when Argentina was seeking a new path amid 
the ruins of capitalism’s greatest crisis. The triumph of 
a response imposed by the most savage of means put 
an abrupt end to the project with which Furtado hoped 
to continue the work of Prebisch, and this stamped 
a bitter and indelible mark on his memory. But that 
bitterness did not prevent him from recognizing that 
the triumph of a blind and brutal reaction had been not 
the cause but rather the consequence of a failure that, 
in hindsight, seemed to him inevitable.
This is how he put it in a book that dates from the 
time when, as a result of the lurch to authoritarianism 
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in Brazil, he was “crossing an invisible line that 
would mark [his] life defi nitively”.11 In that book, in 
which he tried to draw some lessons from this abrupt 
reversal of fortune, he recalls how “in underdeveloped 
economies, the market for the factors of production 
works to increase income concentration, because there 
are no social forces capable of opposing that trend” 
and he adds that the State, the only institution that 
“can fi ll that gap by arbitrating between accumulation 
and distribution, will act in one direction or the other 
depending on the social forces that control it. What is 
important to note here is that whichever side holds the 
levers of power —authoritarianism or populism— the 
result is an unstable situation, because the excessive 
concentration of income causes social instability, and 
excessive redistribution frustrates growth”.
And events proved that the “political education 
effort” that could make it acceptable to seek a balance 
between these two excesses would be impossible in the 
authoritarian framework imposed by force in Brazil, 
which “restricts citizen participation in political activity 
and degrades the exercise of power by stripping it 
of social control”. By contrast, in the open society 
previously assured by the prevalence of representative 
democracy, “populism [would have been] capable of 
improvement”12 because “practical politics” would still 
have been able “to indicate the paths to building an 
institutional framework that could give effect to the 
ideas of freedom, prosperity and tolerance, which are 
the essence of modern civilization”.13
This is the sad but honest conclusion of one who 
had taken it upon himself, in the name of the State, 
to arbitrate between accumulation and distribution in 
Brazil, as Prebisch had done three decades earlier in 
Argentina, only to discover that the State had fallen 
under the control of social forces that were now less 
inclined to respect the arbitrator’s verdict than to impose 
whatever best suited their perceived legitimate interests. 
He then realized that there was no longer a place for 
him in his native land. Societies willing and able to 
take charge of their economies, like those that Iberian 
and Iberoamerican reformers, from Pombal to Prebisch, 
had used as models, had now been built. However —as 
Furtado also stresses— in the industrialized countries, 
market forces in principle guarantee economic growth 
because they have achieved a balance of social forces 
organized and integrated into the productive system, 
11 Furtado (1993, p. 127).
12 Furtado (1993, p. 148).
13 Furtado (1993, p. 149).
thanks to which the historical rise in real wages 
refl ects the increasing relative scarcity of labour. In 
underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, where 
no such equilibrium exists, “liberalism —an ideology 
devoted to preserving the social status quo through 
gradual reforms— was replaced by authoritarianism”, 
while “socialism —an ideology focused on social 
justice— was turned into populism”. It was diffi cult for 
Furtado not to deduce from this a corollary that struck 
too close to home. Here was someone who had hoped 
to carry on the two-centuries-old struggle to advance 
Latin America, from his position at the pinnacle of 
the State. But as he would discover, that State was 
no longer capable of steering the path of society, and 
1964 marked the end of his homeland career, one that 
had been just as brilliant as that Prebisch had enjoyed 
in Argentina up to 1943. It is easy to understand that 
Furtado continued to re-live this setback, with an 
intensity of feeling that is fully refl ected in the works 
he would compile more than a quarter-century later 
into Os ares do mundo.
As Hodara notes, the shift in the political as well 
as the economic and social climate in Latin America 
that had derailed Furtado’s previously triumphant career 
made it impossible for the Commission’s interventions 
in the now permanent debate about Latin America’s 
future to regain the “prophet-caudillo” status they had 
under Prebisch.14 But that would not stop ECLAC 
from formulating them, nor from extending its analyses 
of the present into a future now more uncertain than 
it had been in the euphoric times when Rostow had 
examined it nor, indeed, from arriving at conclusions 
that were perhaps more accurate than those set out 
in The Stages of Economic Growth. Let me at this 
point offer a personal anecdote from a seminar given 
in Berkeley in 1980 by Osvaldo Sunkel, in which he 
announced that the convergence between the developed 
world and the Third World that had been frustrated 
in the 1960s would be achieved through a change of 
direction opposite to the one in which such great hopes 
had been placed. The fi rst world, he said, would take on 
a more opulent version of the deplorable social profi le 
that had been maturing in its Latin American periphery. 
If I retain such a vivid memory of that seminar it is 
because I also recall my scepticism about that prophecy 
—I was convinced that Osvaldo was disregarding (as 
economists often do) the obstacles to such changes 
posed by the forces of inertia (to which we historians 
14 Hodara (1987, p. 229).
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are more sensitive)— and my surprise when the future 
he announced to us duly began to unfold over the two 
following decades.
Looking back, I should not have been so surprised, 
given the signs of an impending change of scene that 
had been building up over the previous decade. In 
1971, President Nixon ended the dollar’s fi xed-rate 
convertibility into gold. That move refl ected changes 
in the world economic balance that were undermining 
the absolutely dominant position the United States had 
achieved in the course of the Second World War. The 
fi rst oil crisis in 1973 was an even more ominous sign 
of an end to the good times that people had thought 
would go on forever. In fact, it was something more 
than that: it was the fi rst announcement that the magic 
was gone from the economic formula which had 
guaranteed prosperity for the fi rst world, and which to 
survive would have needed an overabundant fl ow of 
raw materials (and to a lesser extent of food) shipped 
at very low prices from the periphery. This upset could 
be attributed to the creation of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an initiative 
of the main oil-producing countries along the lines of 
that proposed in vain by Prebisch half a century earlier 
to the Argentine livestock raisers. As we know, the 
fi rst world’s response was to allow carefully controlled 
infl ation to ensure that the slump provoked by the sharp 
hike in oil prices would not spiral into depression, 
something those with vivid memories of the political 
fallout from the capitalist economy’s crisis of 1929-
1931 were determined to avoid at all costs.
The infl ation to which the First World resorted 
to manage stagnation had the immediate objective 
of preserving the welfare state introduced after 
1945 in Europe, and with less superstructure but 
with comparable results in the United States. This 
was deemed essential to avoid a return to the social 
upheavals of that earlier nightmare. But the economy’s 
next turn would quickly reveal as excessively optimistic 
the notion (which had become popular during the 
previous boom) that government officials tracking 
the situation had adequate tools to keep the economy 
broadly on the desired path, and needed only, perhaps, 
to improve their fi ne-tuning. The fl aws in that notion 
would become clear in the unexpected outcome of 
efforts to keep the economy on track, which, in fact, 
drove it ever further away from that track without 
anchoring it fi rmly in any alternative channel. Thus, 
when the slow but incessant redistribution towards 
wage-earners of a GDP no longer growing as fast 
as hitherto brought the term “negative real interest 
rates” into common use, there were those who saw 
in this the fi rst sign of an unexpectedly peaceful end 
of the capitalist chapter of world history. But when 
infl ation in the United States reached levels that were 
seriously alarming to the general public, President 
Carter decided, in this unsustainable situation, to throw 
his support to those who (according to a formula that 
had become suddenly popular) were ready to squeeze 
infl ation from the monetary system as one wrings water 
from a sponge. This decision, taken in an effort to save 
the essentials of the post-war economic and social 
order, helped take the world economy in a direction 
opposite both to that expected by those who believed 
they were witnessing the euthanasia of the capitalist 
order and to the one Carter himself had intended it to 
take. In effect, he had not counted on the huge inertia 
that had built up in a gigantic national economy too 
accustomed to growth, and he was obliged to enter his 
re-election battle with infl ation not yet beaten. With the 
harsh fallout from a spike in interest rates that brought 
them to previously unimaginable levels, and with no 
sign on the horizon that the long-promised victory was 
within reach, his defeat at the hands of Ronald Reagan 
was inevitable. Reagan’s contagious optimism reassured 
a public overwhelmed by gloomy forecasts that, just 
by willing it, the country would soon be bathed in the 
light of a new dawn. And in fact his victory heralded 
the dawning of a new era. The effort launched in the 
hope of securing a new lease of life for the postwar 
socio-economic order would now be used to give capital 
the chance to retake from labour and government nearly 
all the ground it had lost since the Great Depression of 
1929, when for a time the very survival of capitalism 
had seemed under threat.
The fi rst victim of the abrupt change of direction 
imposed by this model from the very centre of the 
First World would be the Socialist bloc formed by 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. There, since 
the early 1960s, rapid post-war growth had given 
way to deepening stagnation. The bloc then sought 
to alleviate the consequences of that stagnation, 
during the economic and fi nancial boom years that 
its adversaries in the Western bloc were still enjoying, 
by opening up to the credit and investment flows 
spilling over from the West. The fallout from the end 
of that boom is visible in the backdrop to the dizzying 
process that in 1989 saw the absorption of the self-
proclaimed fi rst German workers’ and peasants’ state’ 
by the very bourgeois Federal Republic of Germany. 
This marked the beginning of the collapse that would 
be consummated in 1991 with the dissolution of the 
24 C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 4  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 8
ECLAC IN ITS HISTORICAL SETTING  •  TULIO HALPERIN
Soviet Union. That unexpected cataclysm had few 
precedents in world history, and would close the cycle 
of revolutions in modern Europe with the collapse 
(which looked much like suicide) of the most ambitious 
of all those revolutions. At the same time, it inspired 
in those who had won such an overwhelming victory 
the assurance that they were witnessing an end to 
history whose features were curiously similar to those 
of the beginning of history proclaimed imminent by 
Marx and Engels in their 1848 manifesto. They were 
convinced that in the era now opened by this colossal 
triumph humanity would be governed to the end of 
time by the principles enshrined in the purest version 
of the economic as well as the political and social credo 
that had guided capitalism in its vigorous youth. But 
they were no less convinced that the economic model 
prevailing during the three most glorious decades in 
capitalism’s entire history had just been condemned 
as well by the implacable verdict of history. Indeed, it 
was undeniable that both in Europe and in the United 
States the political forces still tied to that model were 
backed into a defensive corner from which, in an effort 
to save what was salvageable, they seemed resigned 
to yield one position after another to an increasingly 
self-confi dent adversary.
It is not surprising that the 1980s would soon be 
remembered in Latin America as “the lost decade”. To 
a degree even more alarming than in the Soviet bloc, 
Latin American countries had over-borrowed abroad. 
Even Mexico and Venezuela, buoyed by the oil boom, 
found themselves at the end of the credit boom in 
trouble just as deep as their less fortunate neighbours, 
with debts they could not pay off and or easily roll 
over, even at the exorbitant interest rates that had now 
replaced the previous, temptingly low ones.
As that decade opened, the lurch to authoritarianism 
had already extended to the three most southerly 
countries of Latin America. While in Brazil the military 
government succeeded in releasing the desarrollista 
drive, which had proven incapable of overcoming 
obstacles within a democratic political setting, the 
Southern Cone saw an attempt to impose a plain and 
simple return to the outward-oriented development 
model through a kind of State terrorism that in Chile 
and Argentina (and to some extent in Uruguay) reached 
levels previously unthinkable in the region.
These regimes had staked all on an economic 
project that turned out to be unsustainable, and they 
would suffer severely from a far less accommodating 
financial climate than the welfare states that had 
fl ourished in Europe during the previous boom. Their 
external debts kept growing as fast as in the previous 
phase, as they resorted to rollovers that provided no 
new resources for their national economies and merely 
postponed the inevitable day of reckoning, when settling 
accounts would be even more costly. The decline of 
the authoritarian regimes sparked by this unexpected 
(although expectable) change of fortune paved the 
way for political transitions. But Argentina was the 
only country to have a fully representative democratic 
system restored by the beginning of the decade, and it 
faced the impossible task of administering the fi nancial 
legacy (which was particularly crushing there) left 
by the military government. By then, in most Latin 
American countries, including those that had not 
suffered State terrorism, the hangover from the previous 
boom, while less stifl ing than in Argentina, made it 
even harder to address the consequences of what was 
increasingly recognized as an irreversible change of era, 
and one that was by no means limited to the fi nancial 
and economic sphere.
In this new context, “ECLAC thinking”, which 
since 1949 had been tracking developments in Latin 
American economies and societies with explicit 
analyses and less explicit forecasts, would now 
offer, through the contribution of Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, what we might call a posthumous picture of 
the phase that had just ended. On this basis, Cardoso 
would propose a more modest agenda for change, as 
an alternative to the one that ECLAC had championed 
under Prebisch, and he would also suggest some 
practical ways to implement that agenda, which again 
represented alternatives to the instruments Prebisch had 
tried to use throughout his public life.
In 1968, when intensifi ed political and ideological 
repression by the four-year-old regime in Brazil forced 
Cardoso to seek refuge at ECLAC, he had already 
absorbed some ideas gleaned from the Commission’s 
work into his vision of Brazil’s and Latin America’s 
problems. At the same time, having been trained as a 
sociologist in the traditions of both Marx and Weber, 
he associated himself closely with the perspectives 
that Medina Echeverría had introduced in ECLAC in 
this area. The fi rst fruit of his temporary sojourn at 
ECLAC was a report prepared in collaboration with his 
Chilean colleague Enzo Faletto, which the following 
year became a short book, Desarrollo y dependencia en 
América Latina. Ensayo de interpretación sociológica, 
(“Development and dependency in Latin America: 
a sociological interpretation”) which, as we know, 
generated ripples that are still felt today. In that book 
we can already make out the path that Cardoso was 
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to take upon the close of that turbulent stage in which 
reform, revolution and reaction once again vied for 
the future of Latin America with an intensity not seen 
since the crisis of independence.
The direction that Cardoso would take in the future 
is suggested most clearly in the care he took in this 
1969 book on sociological interpretation to distance 
himself from the generalized explanations for Latin 
America’s laggardness inspired by the rival views of 
history on which these mortally antagonistic alternatives 
were based (although not always explicitly). That 
distance was refl ected in his refusal to offer any global 
dependency theory to counter those already competing: 
Cardoso and Faletto both objected that experience 
offered many situations of dependency with traits that 
did not all fi t those theories. Based on this premise, they 
outlined a typology of these varied situations, looking 
above all at the balance (different in each case) between 
the forces and infl uences wielded by agents external 
to the process that led to underdevelopment and those 
available to the dominant local players, whose support 
of those agents was essential for the continuity of that 
process. They drew on a very concise reconstruction 
of the historical experiences in which these situations 
had matured. More than their conclusions about any 
of these situations, we are interested here in the other, 
implicit premises underlying their argument that 
there was a multiplicity of “dependency situations”. 
Behind the conviction that there are different roads 
to underdevelopment, and that these roads shape the 
profi le of the economies and societies forged in the 
process, it is easy to discern a more general conviction 
about the mechanisms through which every historic 
process must pass, which is entirely incompatible 
with any view of history. This in turn led implicitly 
to a corollary that had immediate practical relevance: 
even after the much-heralded “decade of decisions” 
of the 1960s had come to the most disastrous end 
imaginable, that closure was not an end of history, 
but a turning point which, while undeniably negative, 
had not removed from the scene those who had just 
suffered utter defeat.
At the very fi rst sign that the military regime in 
Brazil was about to enter its decline, Cardoso drew 
from this analysis of defeat a corollary that affected him 
even more personally: he concluded that the time had 
come (even before full restoration of the freedoms that 
the military had suspended) for him to enter politics. 
His political role would not be to offer up arguments 
for the “political education effort” that Furtado had 
thought so essential for persuading a divided society 
that only a solution far removed from the “excesses” of 
both authoritarianism and populism could offer escape 
from the labyrinth in which it was locked. Rather, he 
would gamble on his vision of the future by throwing 
himself into the political arena. As we know, that 
gamble was unexpectedly successful, however desperate 
it might have looked, undoubtedly because, on the one 
hand, our colleague had a very sound understanding 
of the limits that the fast-advancing new world socio-
economic order set on those who refused to give up 
on their long-standing goals in this now decidedly 
adverse context. On the other hand, he also displayed 
an unexpected skill for manoeuvring in the fi eld of 
day-to-day politics.
Cardoso’s career may have shown that, after two 
centuries of proposals for overcoming Latin America’s 
lag, there was still a road open to those seeking to 
follow in the footsteps of that illustrious tradition if they 
decided to pursue it through democratic politics. But the 
end of those two centuries left ECLAC with the same 
problem. Of course, the road chosen by Cardoso was 
closed to the Commission: in the midst of profoundly 
altered circumstances it now had to fi nd an effective 
way to continue the task that Prebisch had assigned it, 
by introducing a Latin American perspective into the 
debate on the socio-economic order, which once again, 
as at the end of the Second World War, was entering a 
time of radical changes.
The task that awaited it would not be easy. The 
decade of the 1980s had already witnessed the crushing 
victory of the business and fi nancial world over both 
labour and the State. As the following decade dawned, 
the collapse of so-called “real socialism” in its original 
Eurasian embodiment was seen by the victorious 
credo’s adherents as irrefutable vindication of the 
economic (as well as the social and political) doctrines 
enshrined in that credo, and in the debates in which 
ECLAC staunchly participated those doctrines would 
form the core of a new orthodoxy that was reluctant to 
recognize the legitimacy of any dissenting opinion.
In this context, however unrewarding, ECLAC 
played the role of a sceptical observer and in response 
to the relentless advance of the new ideological 
orthodoxy it invoked the ever more glaring gap between 
the effects of the policies inspired by that orthodoxy 
and what it had promised to deliver. And we may note 
that, confi rming this argument’s validity, in the 1990s 
the economies of Chile and Brazil, whose economic 
and social policies reflected that same scepticism, 
were the most conspicuous exceptions to the generally 
disappointing performance of the Latin American 
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economies in a decade that for several was even more 
“lost” than the preceding one.
With the opening of the new millennium it was 
already clear that the shift in relations between the 
State and the groups that had occupied centre-stage 
in the industrial society, far from heralding the end of 
history, had opened the way to a great historic mutation 
whose ultimate goal was impossible to foretell, but 
whose course lent itself less and less to confi rming 
the simple lessons that the new orthodoxy insisted on 
drawing from it. And today, while that goal remains in 
the shadows, it is even clearer that the stage at which 
we are now will bring changes far deeper and broader 
than the startling shifts we have already seen, and that 
both those who upheld this ephemeral orthodoxy and 
those who are glad to see it dissipate are witnessing 
the opening scenes of a drama whose plot is yet to 
be revealed.
What should the Commission’s role be in response 
to this gloomy present and uncertain future? Perhaps 
it should retain the role it played in the final two 
decades of the past century, which sowed the seeds for 
everything we are now reaping. That means bearing 
witness and remaining faithful —in the words of Celso 
Furtado, and changing only the tense of the verb— “to 
the ideas of liberty, prosperity and tolerance, which 
were the essence of modern civilization”.
(Original: Spanish)
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